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ARGUMENT 
L GIVEN HIS DUTY OF CANDOR TO THE TRIBUNAL, MR. 
CHESNOFF'S STATEMENTS TO JUDGE CASSELL THAT JOHN 
NIKOLS WAS THE TRUE OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES 
SHOULD BE PRESUMED TRUE. 
Appellee Chesnoff argues that he was precluded from introducing evidence 
that Michael Nikols actually paid for the Properties because Michael Nikols 
invoked his attorney-client privilege. Appellee's Brief p. 23. This Court should 
disregard Mr. Chesnoff s proposed evidence because he previously made an 
irreconcilable statement of fact to Judge Cassell in federal district court. Utah Rule 
of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) states that "A lawyer shall not knowingly make 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." Mr. Chesnoff, 
who was admitted to practice pro hac vice in Utah, was not relieved of this 
burden. A lawyer permitted to practice temporarily in Utah "is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction." Utah Rule of Prof 1 Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. 
9; Utah Rule of Prof 1 Conduct R, 8.5(a) ("A lawyer not admitted in this 
jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the 
lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.") 
At the time he represented Michael Nikols, Mr. Chesnoff unambiguously 
told the federal district court that his investigation revealed evidence relevant to 
the Properties' federal lis pendens. On at least three separate occasions, Mr. 
Chesnoff stated that his evidence showed thait John Nikols was the true owner of 
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the Properties. First, he stated that "none of these properties are in any way 
associated with any kind of criminal activity" and he made "that representation to 
you based on my investigation and the work we've done to prepare for the trial." 
R. 421, Exhibit C: 16 (13-21) (Status Hearing, Sept. 29, 2005). Second, he 
represented that the "strongest part of the defense of this Indictment [was] to the 
forfeitures" because the Properties' purchase was the result of "good old fashioned 
hard work." R. 996, Exhibit 2: 23-24 (Detention Hearing, Oct. 6, 2005). Finally, in 
this case, at the evidentiary hearing where he sought to admit evidence of drug 
proceeds paying for the Properties, Mr. Chesnoff conceded that in his 
representation "he made certain" that "Michael's drug money was not used to 
acquire the Murray properties" and affirmatively represented that John bought the 
property. R. 2953: 140-41. 
This Court should grant Mr. Chesnoff the benefit of the doubt and assume 
that he did not make false statements of fact to the federal district court in Michael 
Nikols' criminal proceedings. His duty of candor reflects that he was truthful 
when he stated that he possessed evidence that proved that John Nikols was the 
true owner and that no drug money was trafficked through the Properties. If, like 
he stated, John Nikols purchased the Properties, Mr. Chesnoff would have no 
contrary evidence to admit at the evidentiary hearing. 
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EL EVIDENCE OF MICHAEL NIKOLS' ALLEGED DRUG DEALINGS 
WAS INADMISSIBLE AND IRRELEVANT. 
Appellee Chesnoff also argues that confidential attorney-client 
communications regarding Michael Nikols' alleged drag trafficking were 
admissible in certain contexts. Appellee's Brief p. 18. This Court should reject 
Mr. Chesnoff s argument because evidence of alleged drug dealing is inadmissible 
and irrelevant to his claims. Michael Nikols agreed to testify about the Properties' 
titles, payments, ownership, maintenance, and management. R. 2953: 118 (13-20). 
He only refused to discuss his pending drug charges. Based on this invocation, and 
choosing not to elicit other relevant evidence, Mr. Chesnoff argues that Michael 
Nikols was hiding drug proceeds in the Properties. Appellee's Brief p. 19-20. 
Evidence Mr. Chesnoff claimed to have of Michael Nikols' alleged drug 
proceeds was inadmissible. Mr. Chesnoff attempts to persuade this Court that 
Michael Nikols is a "drug kingpin," ignoring the fact that he has not been 
convicted.1 R. 2953: 155(10-20). An arrest without a conviction cannot be used 
to impeach the witness's integrity. Michelson v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 213, 222 
(1948); State v. Dickinson, 361 P.2d 412 (Utah 1961). Furthermore, specific 
instances of conduct can be admitted only to attack the witness's character if the 
conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Utah R. Evid. 608(b) 
1
 Michael Nikols' guilty plea in his criminal case was later withdrawn by Judge 
Cassell. Evidence of a guilty plea later withdrawn is not admissible against the 
defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding unless it is in a criminal proceeding 
for perjury or false statement. Utah R. Evid. 410. 
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(emphasis added). Conduct like fraud and deceit is distinct from drug crimes, 
which are not probative of truthfulness. Fair v. Henson, 84 S.W.3d 871 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2002) (citing Rhodes v. State, 634 S.W.2d 107 (Ark. 1982)); Crimm v. 
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 750 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Dennis v. State, 
2008 WL 2744237, 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.). Even if Michael Nikols had been 
convicted of drug dealing, impeaching evidence of a prior conviction is restricted 
to the fact of the conviction and is not admissible to show the details and events of 
the crime. State v. Hansen, 448 P.2d 720 (Utah 1968). 
Furthermore, Mr. ChesnofFs argument that Michael Nikols' paid for the 
Properties with drug money is illogical. A drug dealer would not openly title real 
property in his name to conceal his illegal profits. In addition, Mr. Chesnoff 
argues that Michael Nikols was in a position to funnel money through Coachman's 
Restaurant because he helped his father manage it. However, the Restaurant is not 
attached to Mr. Chesnoff s judgment lien and there has been no evidence that 
Michael Nikols helped manage any of the four remaining Properties at issue.2 
Mr. Chesnoff exhausts this issue by arguing that Michael Nikols' alleged 
drug dealing showed bias among the two men, motive to lie or misrepresent, or a 
scheme to transfer the properties back and forth. Appellee's Brief p. 19. However, 
no evidence exists that John Nikols was involved in the alleged drug scheme. 
Furthermore, Mr. Chesnoff had ample opportunity to elicit this testimony from 
The four Properties are parking lots abutting John Nikols' Primary Property 
facing State Street, which he has owned for more than 30 years. R. 2953: 58-59; 
89 (14-23). Combined, these five properties operate as a unit. 
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John Nikols. He could have inquired about John and Michael Nikols' father-son 
relationship, including which of them paid his retainer and their past business 
transactions. Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Chesnoff could have testified about 
conversations he had with John Nikols about the Properties, their title and the 
federal lis pendens. This evidence was admissible as it was conclusively 
established that there was no attorney-client privilege between John Nikols and 
Mr. Chesnoff. R. 1957-64. 
In sum, no legitimate purpose existed for inquiring into confidential 
communications between Michael Nikols and Mr. Chesnoff about alleged drug 
dealing. Mr. Chesnoff readily rejected his opportunity to elicit relevant testimony 
and used the confidential communications as a tool to prevent harmful testimony. 
It appears Mr. Chesnoff threatened to cross examine Michael Nikols about drug 
deals to brand him as a drug dealer and intimidate him from testifying about other 
relevant evidence. 
ffl. THE ASSUMPTION THAT JOHN NIKOLS TITLED THE 
PROPERTIES IN HIS SON'S NAME TO AVOID HIS CREDITORS 
IS IRRELEVANT BECAUSE APPELLEE IS NOT HIS CREDITOR. 
Mr. Chesnoff argues that he can execute his judgment against the Properties 
because John Nikols titled them in his son's name with a fraudulent purpose. Mr. 
3
 Mr. Chesnoff s counsel told the Court: First, "I fully intend to question him 
about his credibility and his involvement with drugs." R. 2953: 117 (2-7); Second, 
"you will subject yourself to clear testimony that he dealt drugs and admitted to 
the same." R. 2953: 129 (8-11); and Third: "But the second prong of the resulting 
trust was an admitted long-time, head drug kingpin drug dealer, then that 
prejudices me to a great extent." R. 2953: 155 (10-20). 
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Chesnoff s argument is misplaced because he is not a creditor of John Nikols. R. 
1957. It is undisputed that John Nikols' 1988 creditors could have attached the 
Properties to the extent of their debt.4 The court below clearly established in its 
Order of Summary Judgment that Mr. Chesnoff s sole debtor is Michael Nikols. 
R. 1957-64. In addition to being addressed and signed only by Michael Nikols, 
Mr. Chesnoff s retainer agreement and the affidavit he filed in this Complaint 
explicitly states that no real property operated as a surety. 
Utah law is well settled that a judgment creditor "of a debtor holding bare 
legal title to property cannot attach the equitable interest in the property, as it is 
vested in another." Capital Assets Financial Services v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 
1095 (Utah 1998) (internal citations omitted); Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, 109 
(Utah 1983). Confusing this doctrine, Mr. Chesnoff continues to misapply the 
holding of Woodward v. Funderbunk, 846 So. 2d 363, 365 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). 
In Woodward, a father titled his land in his son's name to avoid the tax 
commission's judgment against him. Id. Later, a judgment was entered against 
his son, the bare title holder, whose creditor argued that he could use the property 
to execute his judgment because the titling sought to avoid the father's creditors. 
Id. While finding the titling was in fact fraudulent, the court held that the son's 
creditors could obtain no interest in the property since he held merely the bare 
4
 It is stipulated that John Nikols' creditors were not paid until after the titles were 
put in Michael Nikols' name in 1988. R. 2953:5 (6-13). 
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legal title. Id. at 369. Naturally, however, his father's creditors could have 
proceeded against the land since he was the equitable owner. Id, 
Mr. Chesnoff, as Michael Nikols' creditor, can obtain no interest in the 
Properties, just as the son's creditors in Woodward could not. As Michael Nikols 
holds no interest in them, there is no interest for Mr. Chesnoff to obtain. John 
Nikols' 1988 creditors are the sole parties who could have obtained a judgment 
against the Properties. 
IV. MR. NIKOLS WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE FINDINGS BELOW WERE TOO 
INADEQUATE TO AID THIS COURT IN ITS REVIEW. 
Appellee Chesnoff urges this Court to allow him to execute his judgment 
on the Properties because John Nikols failed to marshal the evidence. Mr. 
Chesnoff fails to acknowledge that the factual findings below consisted of 
stipulated facts and legal conclusions, which precluded any meaningful attempt at 
marshaling. An appellant does not need to ''marshal the evidence when the 
findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual 
determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 28 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted); Fazzio at 477. Where "the findings are not of 
that caliber, appellant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise" because 
"meaningful review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible." 
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Fazzio at 477 (citing State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah Ct App. 1990)). 
Marshaling is a tool crafted to ease this Court's burden of weighing the 
facts on both sides. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, % 19 ("a tool 
pursuant to which the appellate courts impose on the parties an obligation to assist 
them in conducting a whole record review. It is not, itself, a rule of substantive 
law"). It would be impossible for John Nikols to "ferret out a fatal flaw" in the 
evidence and play "devil's advocate" because the adversary presented no evidence 
on its own behalf. Id. at f 17; United Park City Mines Co. v. Stitching Mayflower 
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^ 26. Instead, the lower court's inadequate findings 
have put this Court "in the awkward position of having to speculate about what the 
court actually determined the facts to be, without benefit of the guidance that 
proper factual findings are meant to provide." Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 478. 
In this case, the court made six findings of fact: First, the evidentiary 
hearing was the time to present evidence opposing the writ of attachment; second 
and third, there was stipulated evidence that John Nikols had not paid liens against 
the property at the time it was titled in Michael Nikols' name in 1988; fourth, Mr. 
Chesnoff could not "fully" cross examine Michael Nikols because he refused to 
waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; fifth, John and Michael Nikols 
desired Mr. Chesnoff not to testify; and sixth, the failure of Michael Nikols and 
Mr. Chesnoff to testify prejudiced Mr. Chesnoff. 
Utah courts have found that findings are inadequate where they are 
unsupported by the record, do not support the conclusion, inaccurate, irrelevant, 
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lack subsidiary factual support, or are moral judgments or legal conclusions. See 
Anderson v. Poms. 984 P.2d 392, 396-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Fazzio at 478. In 
this case, four of the trial court's factual findings were restatements of facts not in 
dispute. These four uncontroverted facts consist of the court's first, second, third, 
and fifth findings of fact, which were: 
Finding No. 1 
"The April 1, 2008, evidentiary hearing was the time a [sic] place for 
John Nikols to present evidence supporting his opposition to the Writ of 
Attachment and, specifically, to present evidence supporting his claim 
that a resulting trust in his favor existed." R. 2933. 
Finding No. 2 
"At the February 2008 hearing in this matter, John Nikols stated to the 
Court that he had paid all the judgments and liens against him as of 
April 13, 1988 when the first of the Murray Properties was purchased in 
the name of Michael Nikols." R. 2933 
Finding No. 3 
"The Stipulation of Facts presented to the Court on April 1, 2008, 
together with the testimony of John Nikols established that John Nikols' 
previous claim of having paid his liens and judgments were not 
accurate." R. 2934. 
Finding No. 5 
"John Nikols and his son both expressed their desire that David 
Chesnoff not testify regarding the issues before the Court, including 
issues of credibility of John and Michael Nikols." R. 2934. 
None of these findings were at issue at the evidentiary hearing. First, all 
the parties understood the objective of the hearing. Next, the second and third 
findings simply restate a stipulation. Finally, the fifth finding of fact is equally 
undisputable: John and Michael Nikols did express their desire that Mr. Chesnoff 
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not reveal privileged communications about Michael Nikols' pending criminal 
charges. 
The court's fourth and sixth findings are legal conclusions unsupported by 
any subsidiary facts. The court found that Mr. Chesnoff was prejudiced by other 
witnesses' invocations of privilege: 
Finding No. 4 
"Michael Nikols refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent if he were called to be cross examined in this proceeding. Thus, 
Chesnoff would not be able fully to cross-examine Michael Nikols with 
regard to the claim of the existence of a resulting trust." R. 2934. 
Finding No. 6 
"Michael Nikols' refusal to testify and the opposition of Michael and 
John Nikols to the testimony of David Chesnoff were prejudicial to the 
ability of Chesnoff to be able to present his position in this matter in a 
full and complete manner." R. 2934. 
It is a legal conclusion that Mr. Chesnoff was prejudiced by Michael 
Nikols' failure to testify and his own decision to not take the stand if he could not 
reveal confidential attorney-client information. Moreover, these legal conclusions 
are not supported by any subsidiary facts. The findings leave this Court to 
determine what the invocation prevented Mr. Chesnoff from asking, in what ways 
those omitted questions prejudiced Mr. Chesnoff, and what specific questions Mr. 
Chesnoff could have asked. The court also failed to note what facts Mr. Chesnoff 
was capable of producing with his own testimony. For example, in Anderson, the 
Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a case in which the trial court found that an 
appellant's delay in seeking a remedy, which ultimately led to the death of a 
witness, deprived the opposing party of specific evidence, adversely affecting its 
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case. Anderson v. Poms, 984 P.2d at 395. However, the Utah Court of Appeals 
found that because the trial court never stated what specific evidence the other side 
lacked, the finding was a conclusion unsupported by subsidiary facts. Id at 396-
97. 
Like Anderson, the factual findings in this case did not slate what evidence 
Mr. Chesnoff lacked and how that prejudiced his case. Most significantly, the 
court never provided facts it found relevant regarding the resulting trust. The 
findings should have included the role of purchase payments, mortgage payments, 
taxes, insurance, maintenance and the contiguous nature of the Properties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, John Nikols urges this Court to 
find the trial court erred in allowing Michael Nikols' creditor, Mr. Chesnoff, to 
seize his Properties. 
AC / 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of December, 2008 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC 
Rebecca C. Hyde 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum A 
Findings of Fact 
3. The Stipulation of Facts presented to the Court on April 1, 2008, together with the 
testimony of John Nikols established that John Nikols' previous claim of having 
paid his liens and judgments was not accurate. 
4. Michael Nikols refused to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent if he 
were called to be cross-examined in this proceeding. Thus, Chesnoff would not 
be able fully to cross-examine Michael Nikols with regard to the claim of the 
existence of a resulting trust. 
5. John Nikols and his son both expressed their desire that David Chesnoff not 
testify regarding the issues before the Court, including issues of credibility of John 
and Michael Nikols. 
6. Michael Nikols' refusal to testify and the opposition of Michael and John Nikols 
to the testimony of David Chesnoff were prejudicial to the ability of Chesnoff to 
be able to present his position in this matter in a full and complete manner. 
Therefore, the Court enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
A. John Nikols has not presented testimony from available and knowledgeable 
witnesses (Michael Nikols and David Chesnoff) to support his claim regarding 
the existence of a resulting trust in his favor regarding the Murray properties. 
B. The Court therefore presumes that the testimony of Michael Nikols and David 
Chesnoff, had it been presented, would have been adverse to the claims of John 
Nikols regarding the purported resulting trust. 
C. The credibility of John Nikffls and Michael Nikols regarding the existence of a 
resulting trust is a fundamental issue in this proceeding. Chesnoff s inability to 
cross-examine Michael Nikols to assist in determining Michael Nikols' credibility 
as well as that of his father John Nikols was prejudicial to Chesnoff. 
D. The Court concludes that John Nikols failed to meet his burden of establishing 
that a resulting trust existed with respect to the Murray properties. 
E. The Murray properties were legally titled in the name of Michael Nikols at the 
time Chesnoff attached them in December 2005 and had been so titled since 1988 
F. Thus, Chesnoff may lawfully proceed with his writ of attachment. 
4 
At the hearing, David Chesnoff was present and was represented by local counsel Scott 
O. Mercer of Kesler & Rust. Rebecca C. Hyde of Skordas, Caston & Hyde represented John 
Nikois, who was present. Michael Nikois appeared pro se l 
At the beginning of the hearing on April 1, 2008, the parties presented a Stipulation of 
Facts to the Court, wherein John Nikois admitted that approximately $350,000 in judgments and 
liens had not been paid until 1991. John Nikois had previously represented to the Court that 
those judgments and liens had been paid as of April 1988. 
After presenting the Stipulation of Facts, the parties agreed to proceed by proffer, 
allowing opposing counsel to cross-examine the witnesses for whom testimony was proffered. 
Counsel for John Nikois proffered certain testimony of her client and his son Michael 
Nikois in support of John Nikois' claim for a purchase money resulting trust in the Murray 
properties. Counsel for Chesnoff then cross-examined John Nikois. When called to be cross-
examined regarding his proffered testimony, however, Michael Nikois refused to testify, 
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Court informed Michael Nikois and counsel for 
John Nikois that Michael Nikois' proffered testimony would be stricken if he asserted his Fifth 
Amendment rights. Despite this, Michael Nikois asserted his right not to testify and thus, his 
testimony was stricken. 
In addition, Chesnoff s counsel stated that if David Chesnoff testified at the hearing, his 
testimony may include matters that would be detrimental to Michael Nikois' position in the 
pending federal court criminal case. On that basis, Michael Nikois and counsel for John Nikois 
expressed their preference and desire that David Chesnoff not testify. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court enters the following findings of fact: 
1. The April 1, 2008, evidentiary hearing was the time a place for John Nikois to 
present evidence supporting his opposition to the Writ of Attachment and, 
specifically, to present evidence supporting his claim that a resulting trust in his 
favor existed. 
2. At the February 2008 hearing in this matter, John Nikois stated to the Court that 
he had paid all of the judgments and liens against him as of April 13, 1988, when 
the first of the Murray Properties was purchased in the name of Michael Nikois. 
1
 Michael Nikois is currently represented in the on-going federal criminal 
proceeding by an attorney, other than Chesnoff Said attorney, however, was not present at the 
hearing on April 1, 2008. 
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colloquy by then-Judge Paul Cassell, Michael Nikols was allowed to withdraw his plea. Hence, 
the criminal proceeding in federal court is still pending with a trial set for August 2008. 
This Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Goodman & Chesnoff. 
Now, Goodman & Chesnoff seek to enforce their judgment through a writ of attachment against 
four parcels of real estate. 
John Nikols, Michael Nikols' father, filed a claim against Goodman & Chesnoff, 
asserting that he was the owner of the property in question, not his son, Michael Niklols. 
Therefore, John Nikols asked the Court to deny and discharge the writ of attachment against the 
real property. 
At a hearing in February 2008, John Nikols conceded that the legal titles to the four 
parcels of real property were all in the name of his son Michael Nickols. Despite the status of the 
legal titles, however, John Nikols asserted that he was the beneficial owner of the property under 
a purchase money resulting trust in his favor. He asserted at that hearing that the reason the 
property was in his son's (Michael Nikols') name was to avoid problems at closing created by a 
number of judgments shown on the preliminary title report. At the February hearing, John 
Nikols stated to the Court that notwithstanding the title report, the judgments shown were all 
satisfied prior to the closing. 
The Court scheduled a hearing on April 1, 2008, to give John Nikols and his counsel the 
time and opportunity to present evidence relating to his claim regarding the valid existence of a 
resulting trust. 
At the hearing on April 1, 2008, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the 
following matters: 
1. Plaintiffs Goodman & Chesnoff and David Z. Chesnoff s ("Chesnoff) Motions 
for Order Authorizing Writ of Attachment. 
2. Third-Party Plaintiff John Nikols' Motions for Order Discharging Writ of 
Attachment. 
3. Determining the validity of John Nikols' claim of a purchase money resulting 
trust in his favor in the following adjacent Murray, Utah, real property parcels 
titled in the name of his son, Michael Nikols during the period from 1988 to 2006: 
75 East Edison Avenue 
71 East 4340 South 
85 East Edison Avenue 
72 East Fireclay Avenue 
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GOODMAN & CHESNOFF, a Nevada 
Corporation; and DAVID Z. CHESNOFF, 
Defendants. 
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
Civil No. 050921826 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Introduction: 
This is an action by Plaintiffs Goodman & Chesnoff to collect legal fees from their 
former client Michael John Nikols (herein, "Michael Nikols")- Pursuant to a written agreement, 
Goodman & Chesnoff were to serve as counsel for Michael Nikols in a federal drug case brought 
in the District of Utah wherein Michael Nikols was charged with acting as a "drug kingpin 
dealer." 
Initially, Michael Nikols (with the advice and approval of his counsel) entered a guilty 
plea pursuant to a plea agreement. However, because of certain statements made during the plea 
r\Gi*X\ 
G. The Murray properties are now subject to execution of the judgment in this case. 
Therefore, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed: 
I. The Chesnoff Motions for Order Authorizing Writ of Attachment are GRANTED. 
II. The Nikols Motions for Order Discharging Writ of Attachment are DENIED. 
III. The Murray properties are now subject to execution of the judgment in this case 
pursuant to the Writ of Attachment issued in this case. 
IV. This is the final order on this matter. 
Dated: April 29, 2008 
By the Court: 
-43 
John Paul Kennedy, 
id District Court 
fflbi 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
follovj^ rvg people tor case GSQ921S26 by the method ai\d. on the date 
specified 
METHOD NAME 
Mail MICHAEL JOHN NIKOLS 
Defendant 
1500 Cadet Rd 
Taft, CA 93268 
Mail REBECCA C HYDE 
Attorney DEF 
341 S MAIN ST STE 303 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail SCOTT 0 MERCER 
Attorney PLA 
MCINTYRE BUILDING 2ND FLOOR 
68 S MAIN ST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84101-1020 
Mail GREGORY G SKORDAS 
Attorney DEF 
341 S MAIN ST STE 303 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this 4 day of 20 D8 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last! 
otf^fe 
Addendum B 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 
C West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
^Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
3! Advocate 
-•RULE 3.3. CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a)(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement 
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; 
(a)(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known 
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel; or 
(a)(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client or 
a witness called by the lawyer has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to 
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if 
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than 
the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
false. 
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a 
person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct 
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal. 
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the 
proceeding and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts 
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether 
or not the facts are adverse. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Addendum C 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
Law Firms and Associations 
RULE 5.5. UNAUTHORIZED PBLACTICE OF LAW; 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the 
legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. 
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not: 
(b)(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other 
systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or 
(b)(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice 
law in this jurisdiction. 
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or 
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary 
basis in this jurisdiction that: 
(c)(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; 
(c)(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal 
in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is 
authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so 
authorized; 
(c)(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation or other 
alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services 
arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac 
vice admission; or 
(c)(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related 
to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction and not disbarred or 
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction may provide legal services in this jurisdiction 
that: 
(d)(1) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not 
services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or 
(d)(2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of 
this jurisdiction. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Repealed and reenacted effective November 1, 2005.] 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
Law Firms and Associations 
RULE 5.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW 
COMMENT [9] 
Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by 
law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal 
or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing 
admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. 
Under paragraph (c)(2), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer 
appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a 
court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted to 
practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing 
before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the lawyer to obtain 
that authority. 
Addendum D 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice 
Chapter 13. Rules of Professional Conduct (Refs & Annos) 
Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession 
RULE 8.5. DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW 
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject 
to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct 
occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary 
authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services 
in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this 
jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct. 
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the 
rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 
(b)(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the 
jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; 
and 
(b)(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct 
occur, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules 
of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to 
discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Repealed and reenacted effective November 1, 2005.] 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Addendum E 
Utah Rule of Evidence 410 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits 
RULE 410. INADMISSIBILITY OF PLEAS, PLEA DISCUSSIONS, AND 
RELATED STATEMENTS 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or 
criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a 
participant in the plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either of the 
foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of 
guilty later withdrawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another statement 
made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the 
statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal 
proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant 
under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel. 
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